Energy Fixes That Outlast the Election Cycle


ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN THE DISPATCH’S ENERGY NEWSLETTER

The best solution to America’s energy affordability problem is also the least popular one.

Welcome to Dispatch Energy! There’s been no end to debates about energy affordability and permitting reform lately, and on this Election Day, we dive into the connection between the two.

Amid high fuel prices, many candidates for the House and Senate have spent the last several months explaining why their preferred market interventions are the right ones. Yet rarely have politicians called for letting the economy’s “invisible hand” function. This dynamic creates an inherent tension between voters’ demand for action and more prudent, slower-moving policy.

As voters review the array of policy proposals meant to address energy affordability, politicians are summoning the ghosts of energy crises past in search of ideas. Among them are gas tax holidays, subsidies, export bans, and promoting renewables. Politicians have also taken to blaming “price gouging,” blaming data centers, and blaming global conditions outside of their control.

I don’t envy politicians who need to offer at least some answer to struggling Americans, even if they know their proposals would offer only temporary relief. But I fear that a persistent reliance on government interventions to slap a Band-Aid on energy prices is coming at the expense of future productivity investments. Even temporary policies aimed at reducing prices, like an energy export ban, can deter investment by signaling to potential market entrants that they will not be allowed to profit when resources are most scarce.

Despite persistently high fuel prices today, the oil and gas sector operates under one of the most favorable policy environments in recent years. Therefore, we would expect to see President Donald Trump’s focus on the industry lead to higher production and thus lower prices. But looking at the first 18 months of the past three presidential administrations, we see that production growth in the American oil and gas sectors looks almost no different under Trump than it did under former President Joe Biden.

A bar chart comparing U.S. oil and natural gas production increases during the first 18 months of three administrations, showing the 1st Trump Administration led with 23% oil and 19% natural gas growth, followed by the 2nd Trump Administration with 6% oil and 9% natural gas, and the Biden Administration with 8% oil and 8% natural gas.
Visual by Amanda Swinghamer Henderson.

Production ebbs and flows for many reasons, so it’s difficult to attribute changes to any single event or policy. But it is striking that the Biden administration—which on day one began restricting oil and gas leases—saw just as much production growth as the second Trump administration, which has issued several executive orders to bolster oil and gas production.

Granted, there are some reasonable explanations for slow growth in energy production, like the fact that Trump’s oil- and gas-focused executive orders haven’t been fully implemented, or the scarcity of refining capacity, which hasn’t been a policy priority. What’s more, growth during the Biden administration reflected a post-pandemic bounce back, while the second Trump administration is building on record highs. But an alternative explanation for slow production growth worth entertaining is that, when industry is constantly under the threat of government intervention, long-term investments in production become riskier. This is true even when such interventions are viewed as favorable to an industry, because that same authority can be wielded in favor of a future competitor.

A point in favor of the intervention risk argument is that investing in energy production requires new infrastructure to be profitable over a period that outlasts momentary political conditions. We still use nuclear power plants that began operating in 1969, and the last year a major new oil refinery was built in the U.S. was 1977 (most refining capacity in recent years has come from capacity expansions rather than new facilities). Energy infrastructure needs to remain profitable not for years, but for decades to be considered worthwhile.

It is therefore worth asking if there are economic conditions that may be deterring long-term energy investment. Perhaps the problem is an unpredictable regulatory environment? An unpredictable lease environment? An unpredictable permitting process?

The idea that fickle energy policy is stifling investment signals can also help to explain why the first Trump administration’s approach led to growing production. If investors viewed the Obama administration’s interventionist “pen and phone” policy as a temporary hiccup and Trump’s first administration as a return to normalcy, investment would then be appropriately responsive to price signals. But when the Biden administration reverted to and expanded upon the policy directions of the Obama administration, that likely signaled to investors that government interventions were no longer rare occurrences but rather a new normal.

Even the current administration’s reversal of Biden’s policies can be problematic, as each policy reversal compounds uncertainty. Under the first Trump administration, regulatory changes were often aimed at restoring earlier norms of benefit calculations. But the current Trump administration’s recent moves have focused on more comprehensive changes, like repealing the endangerment finding for greenhouse gases.

Reducing prices by increasing supply, therefore, will probably require a stable environment where investments in production can rise and fall upon their merits. The problem is that achieving stability under the current system requires reasonable political consensus on forward-looking policy that won’t be quickly upended under a new administration. Put simply, bipartisanship is needed—and it’s in short supply these days.

Fortunately, politicians can only fend off concerns about constituents’ economic pain for so long before voters demand a reckoning on costs. In the current environment of extraordinarily high energy prices, the political appetite for durable energy policy that benefits consumers is only growing. The evidence of this is the Senate’s permitting reform bill, but the vote on the legislation is scheduled for after the midterm elections, indicating that, apparently, making it easier to build in the United States was not considered a valuable proposition for today’s voters.

The core problem is the disconnect between what voters say they want (lower energy costs) and what they actually vote for (government interventions). But this disconnect can’t last forever. Eventually, politicians must address affordability problems or lose their office. During the energy crises of the 1970s, for example, President Jimmy Carter’s inability to bring down prices got him voted out of office. President Ronald Reagan, who subsequently focused on curtailing price controls to bolster production, was by contrast reelected in one of the biggest landslides in electoral history.

The big question for the elected officials who will emerge victorious today is whether they can reject the siren song of politically popular interventions and instead engage in the mundane efforts that make America a better place to invest and do business in. If they can embrace the latter, Americans will benefit. If not, political opportunism will continue to exact an economic toll.